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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates how government size influences the responses of government expenditure 
and economic growth to broad dollar shocks in 155 trade-heavy countries across 6 continents from 
1995 to 2019. In most cases, we document that the magnitude of contractions in expenditures and 
economic growth from broad dollar appreciations depends on the size of government. Countries 
with large governments experience a more severe negative impact from dollar appreciations than 
countries with smaller governments and this is true for different expenditure types: total, current 
and capital government expenditures. Accordingly, government size plays a role in the disparities 
observed in the responses of expenditure and growth to broad dollar shocks across these countries.  
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1. Introduction  
The dollar influences economic activity through various mediums including trade, fiscal policies 
(such as government expenditure), and international financial activities that include cross-broader 
flows. More recently, attention has been channelled into how dollar shocks impact economies via 
the financial and trade channels. The financial channel is gaining prominence in light of enhanced 
cross-border flows which have gone hand-in-hand with globalisation, greater balance sheets 
integration and financial risk-taking capabilities. The trade channel is historically more prominent 
and manifests on the real economy through net exports. Both channels can move in the same or 
opposite directions. Under standard open economy models such as the Mundell-Fleming model 
(Mundell, 1963; Fleming, 1962), dollar appreciations relative to domestic currencies enhance net 
exports and hence support real economic activity. Conversely, under the more recent ‘dominant 
currency paradigm, the dominant currency of trade is the dollar rather than the home country’s 
currency (Gopinath, Boz, Casas, Díez, Gourinchas & Plagborg-Møller, 2020). So, dollar 
appreciations relative to domestic currencies are associated with trade reductions which can stifle 
net exports and dampen economic activity. Meanwhile, on the financial side, dollar appreciations 
stifle risk-taking capacity and cross-border lending in dollars, because borrowers’ liabilities 
become elevated, balance sheets get weaker and borrowing risk worsens, which in turn dampens 
real economic activity (Hofmann, Shim & Shin, 2016; Kearns & Patel, 2016; Avdjiev, Bruno, 
Koch & Shin, 2019). Thus, under traditional models, trade and financial channels work in opposite 
directions.  
Under the more recent dominant currency paradigm where the modal trades are invoiced in dollars, 
both the trade and financial channels work in the same direction. In general, economic activity 
such as government expenditures and economic growth should weaken or improve depending on 
the impact of dollar appreciations on the channels of shock transmission. For instance, under the 
dominant currency paradigm, dollar appreciations dampen trade; this would rub negatively on 
economic activity for trade-heavy countries. Similarly, based on cross-border dollar flows, dollar 
appreciations weaken borrowers’ balance sheets and elevates borrowing risk, leading to depressed 
lending in dollars and a slowdown in economic activity.  
There is empirical evidence on the existence and importance of the trade and financial channels of 
dollar shocks. Gopinath et al. (2020) have documented a dominant currency paradigm for which 
they find that dollar appreciations predict declines in trade volumes. Avdjiev et al. (2019) have 
shown that stronger dollar leads to lower dollar-denominated cross-border bank flows and lower 
real investment in emerging market economies. In the same way, Avdjiev et al. (2019) have shown 
that dollar appreciations contract cross-border bank lending denominated in US dollars while 
Shousha (2019) recently demonstrated how dollar appreciations lead to declines in output, 
investment, and private sector credit in emerging market economies, where the transmission of 
dollar movements to the economies occurs mainly through the financial channel. Along the same 
line, Kearns and Patel (2016) have found evidence that the financial channel partly offsets the trade 
channel for emerging market economies and that investment is found to be particularly sensitive 
to the financial channel. All of these studies have one thing in common – that dollar appreciations 
can be contractionary for economic activity. However, none of these studies attempted to consider 
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the role of government size in the transmissions of dollar shocks to domestic economic activity 
across countries even though there are several reasons why such role is intuitively plausible. 
For trade-heavy countries, shocks that give rise to dollar appreciations can significantly influence 
economic activity. This influence can occur through the trade or financial channels, as documented 
in the studies discussed above. One important conduit which this paper will explore is the role of 
government size in explaining the responses of economic growth and government expenditures to 
dollar appreciations. Trade-heavy countries’ governments can enhance spending to sustain their 
size and contribute favourably to economic activity when trade and its accessibility is benign, then 
cross-border dollar borrowing becomes less risky; both of which occurs only in the absence of 
shocks that trigger large dollar appreciations, as recent studies have shown. This also means that 
with dollar appreciations, these sources of funds for the governments are likely to be adversely 
affected, so that the more the governments rely on proceeds from trade or cross-border dollar 
borrowing to fund expenditures and maintain size, the more spending and economic activities are 
adversely affected. In this light, government size should play a plausible role in explaining the 
extent to which dollar appreciations affects economic activity across trade-intensive countries.  
Past studies such as Avdjiev et al. (2019) consider dollar impact on real investment from the 
perspective of exchange rate’s influence through the effects of global risk on cross-border lending 
in dollars. Bruno and Shin (2015, 2019) also emphasize the importance of the dollar on real 
outcomes through competitiveness and variations in dollar credit supply using comprehensive 
export data of firms. Bruno, Kim and Shin (2018) perform similar investigations for manufacturing 
firms in Asia. Therefore, previous studies have focused on dollar and economic linkages through 
both trade and financial channel, without paying a focused attention to a broad collection of the 
most trade-intensive economies at the macro level based on trade openness. Likewise, studies that 
have analysed government expenditure in relation to growth generally did not consider the angles 
of how dollar shocks can impact economic performance and government’s ability to spend and 
maintain its size in trade-intensive countries. Moreover, past studies are quite restrictive as they 
often investigated few emerging market economies alone or performed single-country studies, 
which inadvertently exclude aggregates of a broad collection of countries, limiting the richness of 
the data or making the results less comprehensive. Thus, no one study was found that explored 
dollar-related impacts on national growth and the interacting role of government size, especially 
within the context of trade intensiveness where trade openness is used as the criterion to choose 
countries for a case study analysis.  
As such, the main contribution of this paper is in assessing whether government size plays an 
important role in explaining the degree of exposure of economic activity to broad dollar shocks in 
trade-intensive countries. Particularly, we determine the response of economic activity to broad 
dollar shocks in trade-heavy countries and ask whether the effect of dollar appreciations on 
economic activity is more prominent for countries with large government sizes. We approach this 
novel empirical exercise systematically. First, we examine the hypothesis for a large panel of 155 
trade-heavy countries selected from countries around the world based on data availability. Second, 
we examine the hypothesis using subpanels of the countries segmented into the continents to which 
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they belong. We perform both full panel and sub-panel analysis by considering small and large 
government sizes based on total and disaggregated (current and capital) government expenditures. 
This paper contributes to existing literature in several dimensions. Firstly, the link between dollar 
shocks and economic growth is investigated by considering the role that government size plays in 
mediating this relationship for trade-intensive nations. Secondly, this study is carried out from a 
macroeconomic perspective as several countries across six continents are analysed on an aggregate 
basis. Abstracting from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004), Vivek (2018) and Ibhagui (2019), these 
countries are selected based on their levels of trade openness following a yardstick of 50% for 
random classification in models such that those nations below the average of 50% are termed 
‘trade-light’ while those with at least 50% trade openness fall into the category of trade-intensive 
countries, which are the ones we analyse. Also, key control variables, encompassing financial 
depth, inflation and institutions are added to our empirical specification to control for other factors 
in explaining cross-country variations of economic growth. Moreover, in determining the 
responses of economic activity to dollar shocks, we have employed panel vector autoregression 
(PVAR) approach to construct impulse responses. Thus, given the evidence that broad dollar 
appreciations impose severe consequences for economic growth in trade-intensive countries, this 
paper answers pertinent questions such as the consequences of dollar appreciations for economic 
activity in trade-heavy countries when government size is considered.  
In most trade-heavy nations, trade income makes up a substantial part of government revenue 
which contributes to funding government expenditures, so that lower trade income should reduce 
government revenue and potentially dampen expenditures. Thus, a plausible linkage should exist 
between the broad dollar and government expenditure in trade-heavy countries. Nonetheless, in 
light of the obvious role of tax income in financing national expenses, one cannot boldly say that 
greater government expenditure indicates higher reliance on trade income and therefore more 
exposure to broad dollar shocks.  
To ascertain that government size adequately measures the magnitude of exposure to broad dollar 
shocks, the ratio of government expenditure to output for trade-heavy nations is taken to enable 
cross-country comparisons and eliminates scenarios that could diminish the link between broad 
dollar shocks and government expenditure. First, broad dollar index and average economic growth 
are evaluated against each other for the total sample of trade-intensive countries as shown in figure 
1.2 The graph depicts an inverse relationship, that is, growth occurs when broad dollar index is 
lower and vice-versa. Second, rather than taking average economic growth for the overall sample, 
the sample is segmented into two sub-samples: (i) country-year observations that are less than the 
sample mean of overall expenditure-to-output ratio (small government) and (ii) those that surpass 
the sample  average (large government) such that growth series is computed for both cases. Figure 
2 gives a preliminary evidence which indicates that among trade-heavy nations, the average growth 
of countries with large government size is more responsive to the broad dollar compared to the 
average growth of countries with small governments. 
 
2
 1 The list of sample trade-heavy countries can be found in Appendix I. 
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Figure 1: Broad Dollar and Economic Growth in the Sample of Trade-Heavy Countries, 1995-2019 
 
 
Source: IMF WEO and WDI dataset, Authors’ Compilations (2020) 
Figure 2a, b: Broad Dollar & Economic Growth in the Sample Trade-Heavy (Trade-Light) Countries, 1995-2019, Small vs Large Governments 
   
 
Source: IMF WEO and WDI dataset, Authors’ Compilations (2020). Note: The sample is divided into small (large) government 
sub-sample where total expenditure, as a share of GDP is smaller (larger) than the sample mean.   
 
In the main empirical analysis investigating the impact of broad dollar shocks, the outcome is that 
economic growth of large governments responds more to broad dollar (BDI) shocks than smaller 
governments. 
 
Our paper adds to the existing literature along several important dimensions. On one hand, we 
explicitly demonstrate that the effect of broad dollar appreciations on economic growth and 
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government expenditure is mostly negative and that trade-heavy countries with higher government 
size experience greater contractions in economic activity during dollar appreciations. Specifically, 
dollar appreciations lead to a higher fall in government expenditures and a larger contraction in 
economic growth for trade-heavy countries with large governments compared to their smaller 
government counterparts. On the other hand, we indicate the plausibility of the above relationships 
using both the whole panel of trade-heavy countries and the subpanels created by segmenting the 
countries into continents. We also perform the analysis using government size that is based on 
total government spending as well as disaggregated government expenditures which are based on 
current and capital expenditures. Our extensive impulse response functions reveal that dollar 
appreciations lead to contractions in government expenditure and economic growth and are more 
associated with sustained contractions in government expenditures than in economic growth. We 
obtain this evidence for a subpanel of trade-heavy countries grouped by continents. Six continents 
are in total generated. Thus, in general, the empirical analysis suggests that dollar appreciations 
are mostly linked with declines in government expenditures (total and disaggregated) and 
economic growth, with the relation being stronger when countries have a large government size 
compared to countries with small government size. Having established the existence of the 
relationships for each continent, we repeat the exercise for the full panel of trade-heavy countries, 
as a form of extensive robustness checks, and we find that our main results remain unchanged. 
Results for the continents largely carry over or generalize into the whole sample of trade heavy 
countries. 
 
Our work is most closely related to a growing body of literature on the response of economic 
activity to broad dollar shocks given the dominant currency status that the dollar has come to be 
known for, in trade and cross-border borrowing and lending activities. Priewe (2016) notes that 
out of the daily transactions, the dollar is used in 87% o of world dealings, Additionally, most 
prices of products in the financial markets are denominated in dollar. Goldberg and Tille (2009) 
and Gopinath et al. (2020) document evidence of the dominant currency status of the dollar, 
particularly how the dollar has gained a prominent role as the major dominant currency for trade 
invoicing, finding that a more expensive dollar, i.e. broad dollar appreciations, lead to weaker 
trade. They also demonstrate how the presence of a dominant currency paradigm alters the 
passthrough of fluctuations in exchange rates into import prices and transmission of fluctuations 
in exchange rates into terms of trade, export and import quantities. Furthermore, greater global 
integration of value chain worsens trade responses to dollar and exchange rate fluctuations, 
particularly when dominant currency pricing prevails (Casas, Diez, Gopinath & Gourinchas, 2017; 
Gopinath et al., 2020). Bruno et al. (2018) find that dominant currency paradigm and the 
preponderance of dollar denominated trade credit implies a negligible or contractionary effect on 
exports following dollar appreciations or local currency depreciation, which can diminish trade 
and economic growth for trade-heavy countries. Druck, Magud and Mariscal (2018) report a 
negative relation between dollar strength and economic growth in emerging markets, suggesting 
that a stronger dollar leads to a decline in emerging markets’ real GDP growth. We contribute to 
this literature by showing that it is the economic growth and government expenditure of countries 
with large government sizes that experience the most contractions following broad dollar 
appreciations.  
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In addition to the above papers on trade, our work is also related, albeit implicitly, to the financial 
strand of the literature. Bebczuk, Galindo and Panizza (2010) and Kohn, Leibovici and Szkup 
(2016) demonstrate that weaker currencies, or stronger dollar, are contractionary globally, 
especially given the countercyclicality of the dollar. Bruno and Shin (2015) and Avdjiev et al. 
(2019) have shown that dollar appreciation leads to a reduction in cross-border flows in dollars, a 
situation which can stifle growth and economic activity for governments with substantial 
dependence on dollar borrowing to maintain a high government size. Although not our focus, our 
paper provides an implicit contribution to this literature by inferring that, to the extent by which 
governments and even firms depend on cross-border dollar borrowing, the impact of broad dollar 
shocks on government expenditures and economic growth would be higher for larger government 
sizes. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section two reviews the methodology which 
comprises the empirical model, identification issues and estimation procedure. Section three 
presents and discusses the results while the last section concludes the paper and gives policy 
recommendations in light of findings. 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Empirical Specification 
We employ a tri-variate vector autoregression comprising the three main variables namely: broad 
dollar index (d), government expenditure (g) – capital, current and total, and economic growth (y). 
The empirical specification utilized is given by:  
 
{   
   
  𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖,1 +∑𝑏11,𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡𝑑𝑝𝑙=1𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖,2 +∑𝑏21,𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 +∑𝑏22,𝑙𝑔𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 +∑𝑏23,𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 +𝑝𝑙=1 𝜔𝑖,𝑡𝑔𝑝𝑙=1𝑝𝑙=0𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖,3 +∑𝑏31,𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 +∑𝑏32,𝑙𝑔𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 +∑𝑏33,𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 +𝑝𝑙=1 𝜔𝑖,𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑙=0𝑝𝑙=0
                        (1) 
 
where 𝑖 = 1,…𝑁 represents the countries, 𝑡 = 1…𝑇 represents the years, and 𝜔𝑖,𝑡𝑑 , 𝜔𝑖,𝑡𝑔 , and 𝜔𝑖,𝑡𝑦  
are mutually and serially uncorrelated shocks. For these countries outside the US, changes in the 
broad dollar is exogenous. Thus, assuming that the broad dollar is exogenous helps in identifying 
broad dollar shocks as those exogeneous shocks that occur outside the control of these countries 
and have a major impact on their smooth running and economic outcomes. In line with the 
literature, we also include domestic credit to private sector, inflation and institution as controls 
variables as adapted from Abasimi, Li, Salim and Khan (2019), Avdjiev et al. (2019), Ho (2018), 
Bruno et al. (2018) and Sakyi and Egyir (2017). 
We measure economic growth as GDP per capita growth rate which is more reflective of a nation’s 
actual growth pace (Waugh & Ravikumar, 2016). As earlier noted, the selection of trade-heavy 
countries, which is analysed, is based on the magnitude of trade openness measured as (imports + 
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exports)/GDP. This is much more representative of trading activity than using only exports and 
ignoring imports or vice versa. The US trade-weighted broad dollar index is used to capture the 
behaviour of the dollar. Total government investment and general government expenditure, both 
expressed as percentage of GDP, are adopted to capture capital and current expenditures 
respectively. Total government spending is the sum of capital and current expenditures. All 
variables are obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI) except total, current and capital 
expenditure which come from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook (IMF 
WEO) database as well as institutions from World Governance Indicators (WGI). 
In the empirical analysis, our goal is to examine how small vs large government sizes influence 
the responses of economy activity to broad dollar shocks. In constructing the impulse responses, 
we adopt the procedure of interacting government expenditure to GDP (as a proxy for government 
size) with the variables on the right-hand side of our VAR model, which gives rise to an interacted 
panel VAR (IPVAR) model. This approach is adopted, rather than splitting the sample into two 
subsamples and separately analysing each subsample, because it allows us to maintain a greater 
degree of freedom and fully utilize the entire sample, whereas sample splitting leads to loss of 
degrees of freedom. Moreover, as noted in Sadeghi (2017), utilising pooled sample leads to 
identical broad dollar dynamics and coefficient across sample countries.  
One important advantage of the interacted panel VAR (IPVAR) models is that they allow 
coefficients to vary as a deterministic function of observable country characteristics (Wieladek, 
2016). To construct the IPVAR, all right-hand side variables in the second and third expressions 
of equation (1) are interacted with government size (𝑔_𝑠). This alters the coefficients in the second 
and third expressions of equation (1) and allows them to vary as a deterministic function of 
government size, the observable country characteristic of interest to us. The deterministically 
varying coefficients can thus be written as:   𝑏𝑗𝑘,𝑙 = 𝑏𝑗𝑘,𝑙1 + 𝑏𝑗𝑘,𝑙2 . 𝑔_𝑠𝑖𝑡, 𝑗 = 2,3;  𝑘 = 1,2,3                              (2) 
where 𝑗 = 2,3 is a subscript to represent the relations generated from the second and third 
expression in equation (1),  𝑘 = 1,2,3 represents the fact that for each 𝑗, there are three coefficients 
estimated, and 𝑙 represents, as before, the appropriately chosen lag length. 
We perform a lag length selection exercise and find that based on the Akaike Information Criteria 
(AIC), two lags are appropriate for specifying the model3. We construct the confidence interval 
for each impulse response function (IRF) which is adjusted to suit the panel and utilise the 
interaction terms. The key variables are interacted with capital, current and total expenditures and 
IRF are constructed. The IRFs of growth and expenditure to dollar shocks for small and large 
governments are graphed separately together with their lower and upper confidence boundaries at 
95% confidence interval. Overall, this process is performed seven times – for each of the six 
continents into which the trade-heavy countries are grouped, and for the combined sample of trade-
heavy countries.  
 
3
 Increasing the number of lags does not affect the results. 
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3. Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
This section presents the response of government expenditure and economic growth to broad dollar 
shocks in trade-heavy countries, for small and large governments. Results are segmented in three 
cases: when (i) government size is total expenditure relative to GDP (ii) government size is current 
expenditure to GDP, and (iii) government size is capital expenditure to GDP. The sum of capital 
and current spending makes up total government expenditure.   
To examine the role that government size plays in influencing the responses of economic growth 
and expenditure to broad dollar shocks, the distribution of government spending to GDP ratio is 
broken down, in the spirit of Sadeghi (2017), into 20-percentage-point parts, starting from the 10th 
percentile till the 90th percentile as in Table 1 and IRFs that correspond to these points are 
compared. In this classification, small and large government are represented by the 30th and 70th 
percentiles of government size with regard to each expenditure type (current, capital and total 
expenditures). The percentiles together with their corresponding government sizes are displayed 
in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Cut-Points for each Type of Government Expenditure 
 Total Expenditure Current Expenditure Capital Expenditure 
10th percentile  27 17 15 
30th percentile (Small government) 43 24 20 
50th percentile 53 31 23 
70th percentile (Large government) 63 38 27 
90th percentile 74 49 34 
 
According to Table 1, a trade-heavy country has a small government size or, alternatively, runs a 
small government if its total expenditure is at most 43 percent of GDP whereas the government 
size is considered larger if total expenditure exceeds 63 percent of GDP. For capital and current 
expenditure, the benchmarks for small (large) governments are 20 (27) and 24 (38) percent 
respectively.  
To present the impulse responses, we begin first with showing the IRFs that capture the dynamics 
of the responses of growth and government expenditure to broad dollar shocks in each of the six 
continents for each of the expenditure types – total, current and capital expenditures. Following 
this, we would present the dynamics for the full sample collection of the panel of trade-heavy 
countries.  
Figures 3a-f and 4a-f display the impulse responses and cumulative impulse responses of 
expenditure and economic growth to positive broad dollar shocks for all six (6) continents. Figures 
3g and 4g reveal impulse responses and cumulative impulse responses for the full panel of trade-
heavy countries. In all figures, charts on the left and right represent small and large governments 
respectively, while each row depicts the responses of government expenditure (total, current and 
capital) followed intermittently by the responses of economic growth to positive broad dollar 
shock. 
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Figure 3a: Impulse Response of Government Spending and Economic Growth to a Unit Broad 
Dollar Shock in Europe (Small vs Large Government) 
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Fig. 3a shows the impulse responses and confidence bands associated with a one-unit positive 
shock to the dollar on the expenditures and growth of trade-heavy countries, for both small and 
large government sizes in Europe. In figure 3a, for small government in Europe, an unexpected 
rise in broad dollar leads to a decline in government expenditure which lasts for the first 6 years 
before subsequently turning insignificant. Economic growth also responds negatively to broad 
dollar shocks within the first 2 years, after which the response turns insignificant and gradually 
decays to steady state. Similar outcomes can be seen for large government for which government 
expenditure declines following a positive broad dollar shock in the first few years but soon turns 
upwards after year 3. The response of growth for large government is however somewhat mixed. 
Growth declines on impact for 2 years following a broad dollar shock but this response soon turns 
positive after year 2 and the expansion lasts up to year 5 before becoming insignificant from around 
year 6 to year 8, turning negative once again after year 8 and this lasts up to year 12 before decaying 
to equilibrium. 
However, for both small and large governments based on current expenditure, government 
expenditure does not respond significantly to broad dollar shocks both on impact and as time 
progresses as its effect is not statistically different from zero. This suggests that broad dollar 
appreciations, or even any financial shocks for that matter, may not lead to statistically significant 
changes in government’s current expenditure in Europe, irrespective of whether the countries run 
large or small current expenditure size. This outcome is consistent with the welfare nature of most 
countries in Europe that have large social benefits or social transfers. For small and large 
governments in Europe based on capital spending, a positive shock that gives rise to broad dollar 
appreciations however leads to fall in national capital expenditure. This decline is larger for big 
governments compared to small governments and lasts for 5 and 9 years respectively before 
becoming statistically indifferent from zero. Lastly, for the small government based on both 
current and capital expenditures, economic growth responds negatively on impact for about 1 year 
following a broad dollar shock. Afterwards, output becomes insignificant for current expenditure, 
however, for capital expenditure, this negative response turns positive from year 3 and lasts a little 
over year 6 before decaying to statistical insignificance and then to steady state. For large 
governments based on both current and capital expenditure, some interesting outcomes also 
emerge. For large government based on current expenditure, economic growth responds negatively 
on impact and lasts for around 2 years before becoming briefly positive between years 3 and 5, 
then it becomes briefly negative again before decaying to steady state.  For large government based 
on capital expenditure, the response of growth to broad dollar shocks is not significant on impact 
for the first 3 years. However, it becomes positive and significant between year 4 and 5 before 
becoming statistically indifferent from zero. In most cases, the responses of expenditure and 
growth to dollar appreciations, at least on impact, are bigger for large governments than their 
smaller counterparts for each government size types. 
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Figure 3b: Impulse Response of Government Spending and Economic Growth to a Unit Broad Dollar 
Shock in Asia (Small vs Large Government) 
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Fig. 3b displays the impulse responses and confidence bands associated with positive shocks to 
the dollar on expenditures and growth of trade-heavy countries in Asia, for both small and large 
government sizes. In Fig. 3b for small government (based on total expenditure type) in Asia, broad 
dollar appreciations contract government expenditure. The contraction begins on impact and lasts 
until year 5 before turning statistically zero. For large governments, the response of expenditure 
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to broad dollar shocks appears negative on impact but is also statistically significant between the 
narrow range of years 5 and 6. As for economic growth, the response is insignificant on impact for 
small governments in Asia but becomes positive in year 4 and lasts till year 9 before decaying to 
steady state. For large governments, the response of economic growth to broad dollar shocks is not 
statistically significant.  
We now turn to the disaggregated expenditures (current and capital expenditures). For small 
government (based on current expenditure), broad dollar shocks do not lead to declines in 
expenditure. In fact, the response of expenditure to broad dollar shocks is temporarily positive on 
impact before becoming insignificant after year 2. This is in opposition to the case for large 
governments where the response of expenditure to dollar shocks is not significant on impact but 
turns negative and significant between years 5 and 8 after which it becomes statistically zero. This 
result suggests that for trade-heavy countries in Asia, based on current expenditure type, countries 
that run a small government size behave differently from those that run large government size in 
the responses of their current expenditure to broad dollar shocks. There is evidence that those 
countries with small government size in Asia are able to temporarily sustain current expenditure 
following a broad dollar shock whereas the large size governments may not. Meanwhile, in 
response to broad dollar appreciations, economic growth declines on impact and this decline lasts 
for the first 3 years before decaying to zero for small government. For large government, economic 
growth begins to decline 1 year after the broad dollar appreciations and the decline lasts until year 
3 after which it becomes statistically insignificant and decays to zero. Accordingly, for Asian 
countries that run large or small government size (based on current expenditure), their economic 
growth tends to decline following broad dollar appreciations, but this decline occurs at different 
times, being lower and more immediate for small governments and larger and less immediate for 
large governments. 
Going now to the disaggregated spending based on capital expenditure, we see that while the effect 
of broad dollar shocks on capital expenditure is not significant for small governments in Asia over 
time. This effect is negative and persistently significant for large governments, with the 
expenditure declining on impact and continues along this downward trend for 9 years before 
turning statistically insignificant.  In a similar vein, for large government, economic growth 
responds negatively to broad dollar shocks and this lasts for around 3 years before turning 
insignificant and then decaying to zero. Whereas for small government, the response of economic 
growth on impact is weakly statistically significant and temporarily positive between year 6 and 
year 8, after which it decays to insignificance. Again, it is noteworthy to see that, wherever 
observed, the declines observed in response to dollar shocks are larger in dimension for large 
governments relative to their smaller counterparts, thereby buttressing the essential role of 
government size.  
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Figure 3c: Impulse Response of Government Spending and Economic Growth to a Unit Broad 
Dollar Shock in Africa (Small vs Large Government) 
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Fig. 3c for Africa displays the responses of expenditures and growth to broad dollar shocks. In 
many instances, the modal outcomes share some similarities with the preceding outcomes for Asia 
and to some extent Europe: there is evidence that dollar appreciations lead to contractions in 
expenditures and growth. For expenditures, this outcome is generally more uniform for small and 
large government sizes and across expenditure types (i.e. total, current and capital). For growth, 
the contractionary response to broad dollar shocks is more prevalent for small governments than 
for large governments across all expenditure types, although the negative effects are transitory and 
generally short-lived in the case of small governments for which they are significant, turning 
statistically insignificant just after year 2. 
To provide more details, the impulse responses show that the effect of a positive shock to the dollar 
contracts total expenditures on impact and the contraction continues for the next 9 years for both 
the small and large government sizes, after which the effects become statistically indifferent from 
zero. When the total expenditure is split into current and capital expenditures, the response of 
current expenditure to dollar shock is negative and significant just briefly, between years 3 and 4, 
before becoming insignificant over time for both small and large government sizes. Meanwhile, 
the response of capital expenditures to dollar appreciations is negative on impact and persists for 
11 and 10 years for small and large government sizes respectively, after which the response turns 
statistically insignificant. This finding suggests that capital expenditure experiences much more 
persistent contractions than current expenditure following dollar appreciations, and this finding is 
true for both small and large government sizes that are based on capital expenditures. One way to 
think about this result is that when there is a negative external shock, such as broad dollar 
appreciations, there is evidence that trade-heavy countries subsequently react by cutting capital 
expenditure or allocations to productive government expenditure such as infrastructure, much 
more so than current expenditure. Another way of saying this is that expenditure on capital tends 
to thrive when unfavourable external shocks, such as broad dollar shocks, are absent. 
Turning now to growth, the impulse responses in Fig 3c show that dollar appreciations lead to 
contractions in growth on impact and last for 2 years when government size is small before turning 
statistically insignificant. For large government size, the effect of broad dollar shocks on growth 
is not statistically different from zero. When total expenditure is disaggregated, positive dollar 
shocks dampen economic growth on impact and persists for close to 2 years after which the 
response turns statistically insignificant for small government size (based on current expenditure). 
For large government size (based on current expenditure), positive dollar shocks exert no 
statistically meaningful effect on growth, whether on impact or as time progresses. A similar result 
holds when government size is based on capital expenditure, both for small and large government 
sizes. Meanwhile, for small government size, dollar appreciations contract growth on impact which 
persist for around 2 years before turning insignificant; this effect is not statistically significant for 
large government size. Thus, in terms of magnitude, the effects of broad dollar shocks on economic 
growth and expenditures are more pronounced for large rather than small government size across 
all expenditure types – total, current and capital expenditures. 
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Figure 3d: Impulse Response of Government Spending and Economic Growth to a Unit Broad 
Dollar Shock in North America (Small vs Large Government) 
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Fig. 3d shows the impulse responses and confidence bands associated with a positive shock to the 
dollar on expenditure and growth of trade-heavy countries in North America, for small and large 
government sizes. The results show that when dollar appreciates, total, current and capital 
expenditures display a similar evolution reported for the other continents whose results were earlier 
presented. Broad dollar shocks initially lessen these expenditures, except for current expenditure 
where the result is not statistically different from zero, and the contraction persists for around 9 
years for total expenditure and 11 (8) years for capital expenditure of small (large) governments 
before it fizzles to zero and /or becomes statistically insignificant.  
Meanwhile, economic growth does not respond significantly to broad dollar shocks for small 
government size based on total expenditure. However, for large government size, the response of 
economic growth to dollar appreciations is negative on impact and continues for around 2 years 
before turning statistically indifferent from zero. For government size based on current 
expenditure, the response of growth to broad dollar shocks is negative for both small and large 
government sizes before decaying to zero after 2 years and 1 year respectively, whereas for 
government size based on capital expenditure, the results show that the response of growth to 
dollar shocks is not statistically different from zero. 
Figure 3e: Impulse Response of Government Spending and Economic Growth to a Unit Broad 
Dollar Shock in South America (Small vs Large Government) 
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Figure 3e displays results for South America which are generally similar to the preceding results: 
Expenditures and growth mostly respond negatively to broad dollar shocks for both small and large 
government sizes. The negative response of capital expenditure to dollar shocks is frequently more 
significant and persistent than the response of current expenditure which is either statistically 
insignificant or even temporarily positive. Contraction in expenditures and growth, wherever they 
occur are significant and continue to be higher when government size is large than when it is small.  
Figure 3f: Impulse Response of Government Spending and Economic Growth to a Unit Broad 
Dollar Shock in Australia (Small vs Large Government) 
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For the continent of Australia, we note that, even though trends of results over time appear to 
mimic previous results in some instances, the responses to broad dollar shocks are mostly not as 
strongly significant statistically at the 5% level. This outcome leads us to posit that broad dollar 
appreciations have less pronounced impact in Australia compared to the other continents4.  
4. Robustness Analysis 
In the preceding section, we find that for the individual continents explored, the responses of 
economic activity, being economic growth and government expenditure, to broad dollar shocks  is 
mostly negative and greater magnitude of contraction for larger government sizes, which leads to 
the interesting discovery that prevailing government size plays a role in explaining the extent of 
negative exposure of economic activity in trade-heavy countries to broad dollar appreciations. We 
show that this outcome is largely robust across the three expenditure types – total, current and 
capital expenditures – and that the effect of broad dollar shocks is statistically more severe on 
capital expenditure compared to current expenditure, for both small and large governments. This 
seems to suggest that when such negative exogenous shocks occur, much of the brunt is borne by 
capital expenditure as both small and large governments evidently reduce their productive or 
capital spending which are less pressing to focus more on current expenditures that are urgent. 
In this section, we take the analysis a step further by performing robustness checks to concretize 
our main findings. To perform robustness analysis, the full panel of countries is considered, which 
is a fusion of all the 155 countries that were subpanelled into continents in the preceding section, 
 
4
 Although it is not our focus to explore the relatively softer statistical significance of the dollar in Australia, we note that the 
diminished significance outcome could be because many countries in the continent of Australia utilize the Australian or New 
Zealand dollar and are relatively less exposed to vagaries in the US dollar. This is either because several trading partners engage 
in one-to-one trades that directly utilize these currencies or countries on the continent rely more on debt denominated in these 
currencies or in their own currencies. Australia, as the largest economy or country in Australia, has the vast bulk of its foreign debt 
denominated in Australian dollars and all of the government or public sector debt is issued in Australian dollars (Debelle, 2019). 
This means the government is much less reliant on foreign currency debt and shielded/less burdened from the effect of any decline 
in cross-border dollar flows since it does not depend significantly on it in the first place, hence no significant negative effect of 
broad dollar appreciations on the economic activity. Whatever the nuances might be, our result shows that, irrespective of 
government size, dollar appreciations have limited and statistically insignificant effect on government expenditures and economic 
growth in the continent of Australia compared to the other continents previously examined. 
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and the panel VAR is re-estimated for this full sample of countries from around the world using 
yearly data from 1995 - 2019. Data sources and explanations are listed in the Appendix.  
To a broad analysis for a large collection of countries as represented in this paper, it is imperative 
to employ data which are realistically more available. Indeed, for a sizeable number of countries, 
high frequency data are heavily scanty or generally unavailable, a situation which would limit the 
scope and compromise the depth of empirical analysis performed in this paper. That said, apart 
from availability issues, we note that annual data have some distinct advantages over others. 
Beetsma, Giuliodori and Klaassen (2006) argue that annual data samples are much less vulnerable 
to anticipation effects as do quarterly data samples. Other advantages for annual data include: First, 
fiscal expenditure decisions are mostly made annually, and hence follow an annual cycle. The 
response of economic activity would thus correspond to the effect from an actual shift in fiscal 
policy decisions. Second, employing annual data lessens anticipation effects which are usually 
present in models estimated with quarterly data (Ramey, 2011, Benetrix & Lane, 2013). Third, the 
impact of seasonal effects is circumvented in empirical analysis with annual data. One reason is 
that seasonal variations in government policies normally do not have cycles lasting above one year. 
Fig. 3g below presents impulse responses based on panel VAR for the full sample of countries. As 
additional robustness checks, we also estimate cumulative impulse responses for both aggregate 
panel of countries and the subpanels of different continents and report the results in the Appendix.  
Figure 3g: Impulse Response of Government Spending and Economic Growth to a Unit Broad 
Dollar Shock in Overall Sample (Small vs Large Government) 
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The results presented in Fig. 3g, which represent the robustness analysis based on the full panel of 
countries, as well as cumulative impulse responses in the Appendix, confirm that the main results 
from the preceding section carry over into the full panels of countries and generally hold, even 
after combining all the countries. This suggests that the results are in general not isolated to certain 
regions as it holds across the large panels of countries we have considered over time.  
Indeed, Fig. 3g confirms that the responses of each expenditure type and economic growth to broad 
dollar appreciations are mostly negative and this is true for small and large government sizes. The 
contractionary effects of dollar appreciations are more pronounced for large governments. In 
addition, capital expenditure is persistently more affected by broad dollar appreciations than 
current expenditure, both for large and small government sizes. This provides evidence that 
governments significantly reduce capital expenditures in response to positive broad dollar shocks; 
however, evidence that current expenditures are significantly reduced, even in the presence of 
broad appreciations, is generally weak. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
A growing body of studies have been examining the effect of broad dollar shocks on economic 
activity via the trade and financial channels, at the micro and macro level, for a limited number of 
mostly emerging market economies. Yet, not much attention has been given to providing a 
comprehensive study that examines this issue for economies that are particularly trade heavy 
across countries in the world. More importantly,  until now, no attempt had been made to explore 
the particular role that government size plays in explaining the responses of economic activity to 
broad dollar appreciations: That is, how differing government sizes, based on total and 
disaggregated government expenditures (i.e. current and capital expenditures), influence the 
responses of economic activity - economic growth and government expenditures - to broad dollar 
shocks for a comprehensive collection of trade-heavy countries globally. This paper addresses 
these gaps in the literature.  
We focus on a considerably large panel of trade-heavy countries that cut across both developed 
and emerging market economies and examine the relations between (i) broad dollar strength, (ii) 
government expenditure, (iii) economic growth and (iv) the role of government size in influencing 
these relations. Particularly, our paper investigates how government size influences the responses 
of economic growth and government spending to positive broad dollar shocks in trade-heavy 
countries across six broad continents: Europe (44), Asia (38), Africa (41), North America (20), 
South America (7), Australia (11). However, six (6) countries namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Cyprus, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Russian Federation are commonly grouped geographically and 
historically as Eurasian regions. Thus, after accounting for these 6 repetitions individually in 
Europe and Asia, the total drops from 161 to 155 trade-intensive nations between 1995 and 2019.  
We present two sets of evidence – one for the whole panel of trade-heavy countries (which 
constitute our robustness analysis) and another for sub panels of the trade-heavy countries (which 
is our main benchmark result) segmented into 6 continents – Europe, Asia, South America, North 
America, Africa and Australia. In each case, we explore the responses of government expenditures 
and economic growth to broad dollar shocks for countries with large and small government sizes, 
where the large and small government sizes are determined based on both total government 
expenditure and disaggregated government expenditure, i.e. current and capital expenditures. 
Thus, in each exercise, we have the responses of expenditure and growth to broad dollar shocks 
for two groups of trade-heavy countries – those with a large government size and those with small 
government size, where the large and small government sizes are based on total, current and capital 
government expenditure.  
Our study is not intended to argue that government size plays the only unique role of revealing the 
asymmetric responses of economic activity to broad dollar shocks; instead our view is simply that 
it is an important source of the explanation for the largely uneven responses of economic activity 
to broad dollar appreciations across countries. The previous literature may have ignored this role 
of government size, and demonstrating its robustness, possibly because it has been confined to a 
small subset of countries whose governments may not necessarily derive substantial resources for 
expenditures from avenues that external shocks, such as broad dollar shocks, have a significantly 
large influence on, and thus exhibit relatively little swings from dollar shocks. Instead, here, we 
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consider a substantially large panel of trade-heavy countries, enabling us to perform a 
comprehensive study that fills the gap in the existing literature. Through our systematic empirical 
analysis of a broad set of countries, we are able to generate robust insights on the role that 
government size plays in the responses of economic growth and expenditure to broad dollar 
shocks. 
As a modal outcome, we find that, in trade-heavy countries, dollar appreciations lead to lower 
growth and lower government expenditures, and the result is most prominent for trade-heavy 
economies with a large government size. This outcome is largely robust as it not only holds for the 
whole panel of countries but is also generally true for most of the continents into which the trade-
heavy countries are segmented. The responses of economic activity, economic growth and 
government expenditure, to broad dollar shocks is mostly negative and the magnitude of 
contraction is greater for larger government sizes, which leads us to posit that prevailing 
government size plays a role in explaining the degree of negative exposure of economic activity 
to broad dollar appreciations. We show that this outcome is largely robust across three expenditure 
types considered – total, current and capital expenditures – and that the effect of broad dollar 
shocks is statistically more severe on capital expenditure compared to current expenditure, for both 
small and large governments, which seems to suggest that when such negative exogenous shocks 
occur, much of the brunt is borne by capital expenditure, as both small and large governments 
significantly reduce their productive or capital expenditures possibly to focus on more urgent 
current expenditures. Our paper is the first attempt to examine the role of government size in the 
responses of economic aggregates to broad dollar shocks for a broad country sample of trade-
heavy countries. 
In summary, we have documented a trilateral connection between the broad dollar, government 
expenditure and economic growth for a large panel of trade-heavy countries. More specifically, a 
stronger dollar leads to lower government expenditures and contractions in economic growth. This 
points to a dominant role that the dollar plays in recent times as the currency of trade as well as of 
cross-border lending and borrowing across countries. Differences in government sizes can explain 
the dissimilarities in the extent of sensitivity of government expenditure and economic growth to 
dollar appreciations across countries, for diverse expenditure types.  
Hence, an important policy implication of our findings is that government size plays a role in the 
ultimate effect that a stronger dollar would have on growth and government expenditure in trade-
heavy countries and to the best of our knowledge, this constitutes a new contribution to the 
literature. One main takeaway is that countries that are trade-heavy and run large government sizes 
are more prone to the debilitating effect of broad dollar appreciations. Previous studies such as 
Gopinath et al. (2020), Avdjiev et al. (2019) and Shousha (2019), among others, have shown that 
dollar appreciations dampen trade, economic activity and or cross-border lending in dollars. Our 
paper takes this a step further by documenting that the effect is most prominent for countries with 
large government sizes.  
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Appendix I – Data 
Sample 
Full sample contains 155 trade-heavy countries across six (6) continents from 1995 to 2019. Total 
number of observations is 3799. 
Table A1: List of the Country Years Included in the Full Sample 
Country  Year  Country  Year  Country  Year  
Afghanistan 1995-2019 Guatemala 1995-2019 North Macedonia 1995-2019 
Albania 1995-2019 Guinea 1995-2019 Norway 1995-2019 
Algeria 1995-2019 Guinea-Bissau 1995-2019 Oman 1995-2019 
Angola 1995-2019 Guyana 1995-2019 Palau 1995-2019 
Antigua and Barbuda 1995-2019 Haiti 1995-2019 Panama 1995-2019 
Armenia 1995-2019 Honduras 1995-2019 Papua New Guinea 1995-2019 
Austria 1995-2019 Hungary 1995-2019 Paraguay 1995-2019 
Azerbaijan 1995-2019 Iceland 1995-2019 Philippines 1995-2019 
Bahamas, The 1995-2019 Indonesia 1995-2019 Poland 1995-2019 
Bahrain 1995-2019 Iraq 1995-2019 Portugal 1995-2019 
Barbados 1995-2019 Ireland 1995-2019 Qatar 1995-2019 
Belarus 1995-2019 Israel 1995-2019 Romania 1995-2019 
Belgium 1995-2019 Jamaica 1995-2019 Russian Federation 1995-2019 
Belize 1995-2019 Jordan 1995-2019 Samoa 1995-2019 
Benin 1995-2019 Kazakhstan 1995-2019 Saudi Arabia 1995-2019 
Bhutan 1995-2019 Kenya 1995-2019 Senegal 1995-2019 
Bolivia 1995-2019 Kiribati 1995-2019 Serbia 1995-2019 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995-2019 Korea, Rep. 1995-2019 Seychelles 1995-2019 
Botswana 1995-2019 Kosovo 1995-2019 Sierra Leone 1995-2019 
Brunei Darussalam 1995-2019 Kuwait 1995-2019 Singapore 1995-2019 
Bulgaria 1995-2019 Kyrgyz Republic 1995-2019 Slovak Republic 1995-2019 
Cabo Verde 1995-2019 Lao PDR 1995-2019 Slovenia 1995-2019 
Cambodia 1995-2019 Latvia 1995-2019 Solomon Islands 1995-2019 
Canada 1995-2019 Lebanon 1995-2019 Somalia 1995-2019 
Chad 1995-2019 Lesotho 1995-2019 South Africa 1995-2019 
Chile 1995-2019 Liberia 1995-2019 South Sudan 1995-2019 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1995-2019 Libya 1995-2019 Spain 1995-2019 
Congo, Rep. 1995-2019 Lithuania 1995-2019 Sri Lanka 1995-2019 
Costa Rica 1995-2019 Luxembourg 1995-2019 St. Kitts and Nevis 1995-2019 
Cote d'Ivoire 1995-2019 Madagascar 1995-2019 St. Lucia 1995-2019 
Croatia 1995-2019 Malawi 1995-2019 St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1995-2019 
Cyprus 1995-2019 Malaysia 1995-2019 Suriname 1995-2019 
Czech Republic 1995-2019 Maldives 1995-2019 Sweden 1995-2019 
Denmark 1995-2019 Mali 1995-2019 Switzerland 1995-2019 
Djibouti 1995-2019 Malta 1995-2019 Syrian Arab Republic 1995-2019 
Dominica 1995-2019 Marshall Islands 1995-2019 Tajikistan 1995-2019 
Dominican Republic 1995-2019 Mauritania 1995-2019 Thailand 1995-2019 
Ecuador 1995-2019 Mauritius 1995-2019 Timor-Leste 1995-2019 
El Salvador 1995-2019 Mexico 1995-2019 Togo 1995-2019 
Equatorial Guinea 1995-2019 Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 1995-2019 Tonga 1995-2019 
Eritrea 1995-2019 Moldova 1995-2019 Tunisia 1995-2019 
Estonia 1995-2019 Mongolia 1995-2019 Turkmenistan 1995-2019 
Eswatini 1995-2019 Montenegro 1995-2019 Ukraine 1995-2019 
Finland 1995-2019 Morocco 1995-2019 United Arab Emirates 1995-2019 
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France 1995-2019 Mozambique 1995-2019 United Kingdom 1995-2019 
Gabon 1995-2019 Namibia 1995-2019 Uzbekistan 1995-2019 
Gambia, The 1995-2019 Nauru 1995-2019 Vanuatu 1995-2019 
Georgia 1995-2019 Nepal 1995-2019 Venezuela, RB 1995-2019 
Germany 1995-2019 Netherlands 1995-2019 Vietnam 1995-2019 
Ghana 1995-2019 New Zealand 1995-2019 Zambia 1995-2019 
Greece 1995-2019 Nicaragua 1995-2019 Zimbabwe 1995-2019 
Grenada 1995-2019 Niger 1995-2019   
Some countries do not have complete observations for some variables and for all years observed 
which reduces the number of observations depending on available data for observed countries. 
Table A2: Breakdown of Countries on Continent-Basis 
Countries in Europe Countries in Asia 
Albania Kosovo Afghanistan Nepal 
Armenia Latvia Armenia Oman 
Austria Lithuania Azerbaijan Philippines 
Azerbaijan Luxembourg Bahrain Qatar 
Belarus Malta Bhutan Russian Federation 
Belgium Moldova Brunei Darussalam Saudi Arabia 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Montenegro Cambodia Singapore 
Bulgaria Netherlands Cyprus Sri Lanka 
Croatia North Macedonia Georgia Syrian Arab Republic 
Cyprus Norway Indonesia Tajikistan 
Czech Republic Poland Iraq Thailand 
Denmark Portugal Israel Timor-Leste 
Estonia Romania Jordan Turkmenistan 
Finland Russian Federation Kazakhstan United Arab Emirates 
France Serbia Korea, Rep. Uzbekistan 
Georgia Slovak Republic Kuwait Vietnam 
Germany Slovenia Kyrgyz Republic  
Greece Spain Lao PDR  
Hungary Sweden Lebanon  
Iceland Switzerland Malaysia  
Ireland Ukraine Maldives  
Kazakhstan United Kingdom Mongolia  
Countries in Africa Countries in North America  South American Countries 
Algeria Libya Antigua and Barbuda Bolivia 
Angola Madagascar Bahamas, The Chile 
Benin Malawi Barbados Ecuador 
Botswana Mali Belize Guyana 
Cabo Verde Mauritania Canada Paraguay 
Chad Mauritius Costa Rica Suriname 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Morocco Dominica Venezuela, RB 
Congo Republic Mozambique Dominican Republic  
Cote d’ivoire Namibia El Salvador Australian Countries 
Djibouti Niger Grenada Kiribati 
Equatorial Guinea Senegal Guatemala Marshall Islands 
Eritrea Seychelles Haiti Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 
Eswatini Sierra Leone Honduras Nauru 
Gabon Somalia Jamaica New Zealand 
Gambia, The South Africa Mexico Palau 
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Ghana South Sudan Nicaragua Papua New Guinea 
Guinea Togo Panama Samoa 
Guinea-Bissau Tunisia St. Kitts and Nevis Solomon Islands 
Kenya Zambia St. Lucia Tonga 
Lesotho Zimbabwe St. Vincent and the Grenadines Vanuatu 
Liberia    
Figure A1: Distribution of Government Expenditure as a Percent of Economic Growth 
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Appendix II – Cumulative Impulse Responses 
Figure 4a: Cumulative Impulse Response of Government Spending and Economic Growth to a Unit 
Broad Dollar Shock in Europe (Small vs Large Government) 
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Figure 4b: Cumulative Impulse Response of Government Spending and Economic Growth to a Unit 
Broad Dollar Shock in Asia (Small vs Large Government)  
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Figure 4c: Cumulative Impulse Response of Government Spending and Economic Growth to a Unit 
Broad Dollar Shock in Africa (Small vs Large Government)  
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Figure 4d: Cumulative Impulse Response of Government Spending and Economic Growth to a Unit 
Broad Dollar Shock in North America (Small vs Large Government)  
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Figure 4e: Cumulative Impulse Response of Government Spending and Economic Growth to a Unit 
Broad Dollar Shock in South America (Small vs Large Government)  
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Figure 4f: Cumulative Impulse Response of Government Spending and Economic Growth to a Unit 
Broad Dollar Shock in Australia (Small vs Large Government)  
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Figure 4g: Cumulative Impulse Response of Government Spending and Economic Growth to a Unit 
Broad Dollar Shock in Overall Sample Study (Small vs Large Government)  
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The cumulative response graphs presented above in Figures 4a-g depict the importance of 
government size in explaining the transmission of BDI shocks to economic growth and 
government expenditures. Thus, the accumulated responses of government expenditure and output 
levels to one-unit positive BDI shock are presented for Europe, Asia, Africa, North America, South 
America, Australia and the overall sample study. These re-affirm earlier findings from figures 3a-
g where a positive BDI shock leads to contractions in all expenditure types while negatively 
affecting corresponding growth levels. Although there are brief periods of increase towards the 
positive region, this is mostly followed by declines towards the steady state. For the whole, large 
government has greater responses to small government and capital expenditure records greater 
magnitude of transmitting broad dollar shocks to growth and national expenditure levels than 
current expenditure.  
Appendix IIb 
Table A3: Difference in Cumulative Impulse Response to a Unit Broad Dollar Shock, Small vs Large 
Government  
 
The Fiscal Channel  Total Expenditure Current Expenditure Capital Expenditure 
Europe    
Gov't Expenditure: 
1st year -2.746701* 0.194981** -1.032358* 
2nd year -2.371682* 0.140162** -2.321964* 
3rd year -4.320421* -0.070842** -2.675266* 
5th year -8.72869* -0.576898** -1.938688* 
10th year -38.37661* -1.010481* 0.30408** 
20th year -186.01359* -1.132378* 0.294046** 
Economic Growth: 
 
1st year 26.1995* -14.63032* -4.26712* 
2nd year 74.13436* -8.27033* -19.606077* 
3rd year 112.9373* 5.49932* -21.391745* 
5th year 115.405836* 20.43962* 16.19737* 
10th year 31.18039* -2.86926* 74.52364* 
20th year 36.11388* -0.23758** 56.84194* 
Asia    
Gov't Expenditure: 
1st year 0.060529** 1.356527* -1.787502* 
2nd year 0.918629** 3.416266* -4.264376* 
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3rd year -0.289898** 4.533022* -7.166307* 
5th year -9.71936* 2.611601* -13.162125* 
10th year -38.13058* -3.961849* -20.057502* 
20th year -34.81896* -2.498306* -17.823316* 
Economic Growth: 
 
1st year -20.47122* -3.51715* -37.137738* 
2nd year 83.00769* -124.01478* -50.069583* 
3rd year 122.76019* -165.76363* -56.647776* 
5th year 140.82093* -189.64057* -60.682598* 
10th year 120.11637* -181.69916* -64.30102* 
20th year 137.35119* -113.03221* -63.01481* 
Africa    
Gov't Expenditure: 
1st year 1.322712* 1.997554* -0.245487** 
2nd year 1.137715* 3.844771* -0.944458** 
3rd year -1.734825* 4.210708* -2.416706* 
5th year -14.01358* 0.518301** -6.610475* 
10th year -41.9219* -9.847057* -11.98479* 
20th year -40.71967* -9.172844* -9.09978* 
Economic Growth: 
1st year 13.072139* 13.974222* -16.340453* 
2nd year 1.75049* -29.59783* -37.42841* 
3rd year -15.59043* -28.38738* -52.398411* 
5th year -46.22617* 0.19097** -66.101826* 
10th year -62.61142* 24.197971* -64.350689* 
20th year -59.06048* 21.241252* -62.966871* 
North America    
Gov't Expenditure: 
1st year -1.795155* 0.412647** -1.573499* 
2nd year -3.925125* 1.266173* -3.179244* 
3rd year -5.290384* 2.382094* -4.704822* 
5th year -6.24302* 4.63149* -6.732072* 
10th year -6.43719* 8.05267* -0.63429** 
20th year -6.96465* 11.803327* 5.57636* 
Economic Growth: 
1st year -27.76182* -12.28222* -14.571434* 
2nd year -46.35508* -9.20191* -31.478844* 
3rd year -54.37714* -0.50492** -48.978353* 
5th year -48.61657* 30.599811* -80.939301* 
10th year -25.25256* 66.88517* -112.267021* 
20th year -26.60482* 63.36228* -110.054718* 
South America    
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Gov't Expenditure: 
1st year -1.647201* -1.255236* 1.747932* 
2nd year -3.671827* -2.469628* 1.881969* 
3rd year -4.71227* -3.706864* 1.526276* 
5th year -6.02667* -4.414485* 3.213628* 
10th year -0.00039** -1.741691* 13.787024* 
20th year -1.84358* 2.681642* 25.566874* 
Economic Growth: 
1st year 21.56476* 8.54828* -6.01324* 
2nd year -1.65399* -24.67665* -41.05143* 
3rd year -22.15137* -58.98088* -51.73072* 
5th year -51.67454* -87.86067* -26.67298* 
10th year -60.66606* -69.43648* 22.63109* 
20th year -56.68762* -60.32049* 15.5982* 
Australia    
Gov't Expenditure: 
1st year -2.637791* 1.100811* 1.010102* 
2nd year -1.968338* 2.921695* 1.566231* 
3rd year 0.528342** 6.329617* 2.159566* 
5th year 12.229452* 15.343866* 3.699908* 
10th year 36.33184* 41.813649* 7.820754* 
20th year 24.95762* 104.326686* 10.999535* 
Economic Growth: 
1st year 146.99723* 62.424997* 33.400788* 
2nd year 184.36178* 114.71259* 38.233159* 
3rd year 202.47033* 144.10778* 32.846618* 
5th year 278.52472* 167.62664* 31.097911* 
10th year 379.47859* 153.11915* 30.202338* 
20th year 357.22823* 150.781* 30.443786* 
Overall    
Gov't Expenditure: 
1st year -1.384703* 0.538606** -0.92439** 
2nd year -2.855224* 1.157613* -2.294637* 
3rd year -5.277162* 1.595492* -4.1004* 
5th year -12.59612* 1.785653* -7.930897* 
10th year -27.52998* 0.849576** -11.11372* 
20th year -27.21715* 0.163206** -7.24262* 
Economic Growth: 
1st year 4.96875* 7.488368* -20.583293* 
2nd year 33.040287* 15.732884* -38.005772* 
3rd year 54.37861* 37.687356* -46.542791* 
5th year 68.59872* 77.83992* -49.768249* 
10th year 47.493858* 94.01911* -45.586198* 
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20th year 46.443789* 89.27456* -45.99861* 
Note: *, ** represent 90 and 95 percent confidence interval (10 and 5 percent significance levels respectively) of IRFs 
(difference in IRFs) that do not lie on zero 
Table A3 reveals the cumulative differences between small and large government expenditure and 
economic growth responses to a unit positive BDI shock. In the short run for Europe, expansion 
in total and capital expenditure due to unexpected rise in BDI is of significantly higher magnitude 
than that of current expenditure. In the medium to long run, total expenditure accelerates at a 
significantly much larger scale than large and small current and capital expenditures. For economic 
growth, total expenditure experiences the most effect in the short to medium term but by the long 
run, capital expenditure bears the brunt of the shock effects.  
Meanwhile, Asia’s short run indicates that the responses of current and capital expenditure due to 
unforeseen increase in BDI is significantly greater than total expenditure. In the medium to long 
run, total expenditure accelerates at a much bigger magnitude, followed by capital and eventually 
current government expenditure. Similarly, economic growth responds greatest to capital 
expenditure in the first year but by the long run, total and current expenditures receive significantly 
larger volume of changes in response to BDI shocks.  
Furthermore, Africa’s short run implies that cumulative differences for total and current 
expenditure is significantly higher than that of capital spending in the short run. However, total 
spending bears greater responses to BDI shocks in the long run. As for output levels, current and 
capital spending initially have greater significant responses than total expenditure but by the long 
term, total and capital expenditures receive the most effects of BDI shocks.  
Furthermore, North America’s short run indicates that accumulated differences for total and capital 
expenditure is significantly higher than that of current spending from the short to medium term of 
government size and growth levels. This also applies for South America although current and total 
expenditure takes the majority of effects on output and government size in the immediate periods. 
Notwithstanding, by the long run, total and current spending has greater responses to BDI shocks 
than capital expenditures while for economic growth of Northern and Southern America, current 
and capital spending significantly exceeds total expenditure.  
In the case of Australia, total and current expenditure mostly have the largest significant 
differential responses of government size and economic growth from the short to long run. For the 
aggregation of countries irrespective of continents, total and capital expenditure significantly had 
the most influence on government size while current spending contributed most to economic 
growth in response to BDI shock. 
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Appendix III: Impulse Responses Total Expenditure: 
Interaction values: Choice 1 vs 2 
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Figure A2. Impulse Responses of Government Total Spending and Economic Growth to one 
standard deviation broad dollar shock (rows) at different levels of government spending to GDP 
ratios (columns): G/Y equals 30 and 70 percent. Horizontal axes reflect years after shocks and 
vertical axes represent percentage responses. 
Interaction values: Choice 1 vs 2 
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Figure A3. Cumulative Impulse Responses of Government Total Spending and Economic Growth 
to one standard deviation broad dollar shock (rows) at different levels of government spending to 
GDP ratios (columns): G/Y equals 30 and 70 percent. Horizontal axes reflect years after shocks 
and vertical axes represent percentage responses. 
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Interaction values: Choice 1 vs 2 
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Figure A4. Impulse Responses of Government current spending and economic growth to one 
standard deviation broad dollar shock (rows) at different levels of government spending to GDP 
ratios (columns): G/Y equals 30 and 70 percent. Horizontal axes reflect years after shocks and 
vertical axes represent percentage responses. 
Interaction values: Choice 1 vs 2 
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Figure A5. Cumulative Impulse Responses of Government current spending and economic growth 
to one standard deviation broad dollar shock (rows) at different levels of government spending to 
GDP ratios (columns): G/Y equals 30 and 70 percent. Horizontal axes reflect years after shocks 
and vertical axes represent percentage responses. 
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Interaction values: Choice 1 vs 2 
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Figure A6. Impulse Responses of Government capital spending and economic growth to one 
standard deviation broad dollar shock (rows) at different levels of government spending to GDP 
ratios (columns): G/Y equals 30 and 70 percent. Horizontal axes reflect years after shocks and 
vertical axes represent percentage responses. 
Interaction values: Choice 1 vs 2 
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Figure A7. Cumulative Impulse Responses of Government capital spending and economic Growth 
to one standard deviation broad dollar shock (rows) at different levels of government spending to 
GDP ratios (columns): G/Y equals 30 and 70 percent. Horizontal axes reflect years after shocks 
and vertical axes represent percentage responses. 
R
es
po
ns
e 
in
 e
q.
 1
, 2
 a
nd
 3
 to
 s
ho
ck
s 
in
 
eq
. 1
 
R
es
po
ns
e 
in
 e
q.
 1
, 2
 a
nd
 3
 to
 s
ho
ck
s 
in
 
eq
. 1
 
